R43727 Train and Equip Program for Syria Authorities, Funding, and Issues for Congress

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Research Service

Informing the legislative debate since 1914

Train and Equip Program for Syria:
Authorities, Funding, and Issues for Congress

Christopher M. Blanchard

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

Amy Belasco

Specialist in U.S. Defense Policy and Budget
June 9 , 2015

Congressional Research Service

7-5700

www.crs.gov

R43727

CRS REPORT

Prepared for Members and
Committees of Congress —

Train and Equip Program for Syria: Authorities, Funding, and Issues for Congress

Summary

In 2014, Congress for the first time provided the President with authority and funds to overtly
train and lethally equip vetted members of the Syrian opposition for select purposes. These
purposes include supporting U.S. efforts to combat the Islamic State and other terrorist
organizations in Syria and setting the conditions for a negotiated settlement to Syria’s civil war.
The FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, P.L. 113-291) and the FY2015
Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 (P.L. 113-235) provided that up to
$500 million could be transferred from the newly-established Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund
(CTPF) to train and equip such Syrian forces. Additional funding could be provided from other
sources for the Syrian Train and Equip Program, including from foreign contributions, subject to
the approval of the congressional defense committees.

As of June 2015, the defense committees have approved the transfer of $500 million in FY2015
CTPF funds for the program and an additional $80 million in Defense Working Capital Funds for
related U.S. government operations. Several hundred U.S. military training personnel and a
similar number of support personnel have deployed in support of the program. According to
Administration officials, the intention is for the program to field a force of approximately 3,000
vetted Syrians in 2015 and 5,400 others per year in 2016 and, if authorized, in 2017. The
authority provided in the FY20 1 5 NDAA expires after December 31,2016.

In FY2016, the Administration is requesting $600 million in a new, separate Syria Train and
Equip account that, if authorized and appropriated as requested, would not require advance
notification and approval by the four defense committees.

Current debate over the program — as expressed in congressional consideration of proposed
FY2016 defense authorization and appropriations legislation (H.R. 2685, H.R. 1735, S. 1376)
centers on:

• The amounts, alignment, and terms associated with FY20 1 6 funding for the
program.

• The extent and type of U.S. support or protection, if any, that may be provided to
Syrian trainees upon their return to Syria, especially in the event of attack by pro-
Asad or other forces in Syria.

• The size, scope, and effectiveness of the Syria Train and Equip Program as
currently implemented; its purposes relative to overarching U.S. strategy toward
Syria; and its integration with U.S. -led coalition efforts to combat the Islamic
State organization.

• The content and scope of requested strategy and reporting requirements.

For more information on the Islamic State crisis and U.S. policy, see CRS Report R43612, The
“Islamic State ” Crisis and U.S. Policy, by Christopher M. Blanchard et al., and CRS Report
RL33487, Armed Conflict in Syria: Over-view and U.S. Response, coordinated by Christopher M.
Blanchard. For analysis of proposals related to the Authorization for the Use of Military Force
relative to the Islamic State, see CRS Report R43760, A New Authorization for Use of Military
Force Against the Islamic State: Issues and Current Proposals in Brief, by Matthew C. Weed.

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Train and Equip Program for Syria: Authorities, Funding, and Issues for Congress

Contents

FY2016 Syria Train and Equip Proposals 1

Background and Current Policy Questions 2

What decisions did Congress and the President take to create the Syria Train and

Equip Program? 2

How has the executive branch implemented the Syria Train and Equip Program to

date? 4

Congressional Action 5

What other U.S. government efforts complement the Syria Train and Equip Program? 5

Should the authorized purposes of U.S. assistance be modified? 6

Congressional Action 7

Defending Syrian Civilians from Attacks 7

“Securing” Opposition-held Territory 8

Promoting the Conditions for a Negotiated Settlement to End the Conflict

in Syria 8

What degree of post-training support or protection should the U.S. government

provide to Syrian trainees and on what terms? 9

Congressional Action 9

Defense Department Position 9

What other terms and restrictions limit U.S. assistance under the Syria Train and

Equip Program? 10

Vetting 10

Restrictions on Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADs) 10

Potential Usage Restrictions on Delivery of Future Assistance 10

What congressional notification and reporting of oversight information is required? 1 1

What “sunset” provisions and funding expiration dates are applicable? 12

General Oversight Questions and Policy Issues 25

Aligning Purposes and Objectives, Anticipating Contingencies, and Projecting Costs 26

Measuring “Effectiveness” 26

Terms Related to Authorization for the Use of Military Force 29

Tables

Table 1. Comparison of Enacted FY2015 Legislation and FY2016 Proposals for Syrian
Train and Equip Program 13

Table A- 1. Comparison of FY2015 Requests and Enacted Laws on “Train and Equip”

Program for Vetted Syrians 3 1

Appendixes

Appendix. Comparison of Administration FY2015 Requests and FY2015 Enacted
Legislation 30

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Train and Equip Program for Syria: Authorities, Funding, and Issues for Congress

Contacts

Author Contact Information 40

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Train and Equip Program for Syria: Authorities, Funding, and Issues for Congress

FY2016 Syria Train and Equip Proposals

Proposed FY2016 defense authorization and appropriations legislation under consideration in
Congress as of June 2015 (H.R. 2685, H.R. 1735, S. 1376) would not dramatically change the
scope, scale, purposes, resources, or terms of the Syria Train and Equip program as it was
originally authorized by Congress and as it is currently being implemented by the Administration.
Nevertheless, Congress is considering FY2016 proposals that would extend and/or amend
existing authorities, modify reporting requirements, and appropriate new funds in ways that
illustrate several key policy issues related to the program and to broader debates about U.S.
foreign policy and strategy toward the conflict in Syria. For example:

• Proposed reporting and certification requirements in the House and Senate
versions of the FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, H.R. 1735,

S. 1376) would require the Administration to report to Congress on the potential
provision of U.S. support and protection to program participants upon their return
to Syria from training locations outside of the country. Some supporters of the
program and advocates of a more robust anti-Asad strategy for the United States
argue that the United States should be prepared and willing to protect U.S.
trainees from potential attacks from pro-Asad forces and extremist groups
through defensive fire, air cover, intelligence and/or resupply. Critics of deeper
U.S. involvement in the Syria conflict argue that such protection may entail
confrontation and armed conflict between U.S. forces and the Syrian government
or other actors, with unpredictable consequences.

• Proposed restrictions in the House-enrolled FY2016 NDAA (H.R. 1735) on the
provision of U.S. assistance to those found to have misused U.S. assistance
reflect some Members’ concerns for ensuring that U.S. assistance supports only
those purposes that Congress set out for the program in FY2015 legislation.

Specifically, some Members of Congress seek to ensure that U.S. assistance is
used by U.S.- trained Syrians to combat the Islamic State and not to overthrow
the government of Bashar al Asad or for other purposes. Administration officials
insist that trainees and beneficiaries are receiving assistance to enable them first
and foremost to protect civilians, opposition-held areas, and themselves from the
forces of the Islamic State. Administration officials have said that forces
misusing or redirecting U.S. assistance for their own purposes would not receive
further U.S. support. Nevertheless, some ambiguity exists in the relationship
between the stated purposes of authorized U.S. assistance and Syrian trainees’
intentions toward Asad, raising questions among some Members of Congress
about how U.S. assistance might ultimately be used by recipients.

• Proposed new reporting requirements in the House-enrolled FY2016 NDAA
would require the Administration to report on the feasibility and potential costs of
operations to establish so-called safe zones or no-fly zones in areas of Syria. This
proposed change, while not involving the train and equip program directly, may
reflect preferences expressed by some Syrian opposition activists and their U.S.
supporters — including some Members of Congress — for a broader scope and
scale of U.S. assistance under the train and equip program and/or for parallel
U.S. military intervention to protect Syrian civilians. However, other Syrian
groups and U.S. observers may reject deeper U.S. involvement.

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The potential effects of various FY2016 proposals are analyzed in more detail below in sections
corresponding to current policy questions. Table 1 below reproduces the language enacted in the
FY2015 NDAA (P.L. 113-291) and the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act,
2015 (P.L. 113-235) alongside FY2016 defense legislative proposals under congressional
consideration as of June 2015 (FI.R. 2685, FI.R. 1735, S. 1376). Table A-l in the Appendix
reproduces enacted FY2015 NDAA and appropriations language alongside the President’s
evolving 2014 requests for authority and funds for the program.

Background and Current Policy Questions

What decisions did Congress and the President take to create the
Syria Train and Equip Program?

Congress and the President have debated proposals for the provision of U.S. assistance to the
Syrian opposition since the outbreak of the Syrian uprising in 2011. Members of Congress have
articulated varying views on the potential purposes, scope, risks, and rewards of such assistance.
The executive branch, with the support of Congress, has provided overt non-lethal assistance to
unarmed and armed groups in Syria, in addition to providing humanitarian assistance in Syria and
in neighboring countries. U.S. assistance and weaponry also reportedly was provided to select
Syrian opposition groups under covert action authorities. 1 Through mid-2014, President Obama
and some Members of Congress opposed to the overt provision of U.S. military training or
equipment to opposition forces reportedly in part because of concerns about its effectiveness and
possible unintended consequences. Some Members have opposed the new train and equip
program since that time for these reasons.

The President’s stance was altered by the failure in early 2014 of United Nations-backed
negotiations aimed at ending the Syrian civil war and the mid-2014 offensive in Iraq by the
extremist group known as the Islamic State (IS, also kn own as 1S1L or ISIS). In the
Administration’s June 2014 amended request for war funding, President Obama requested
authority and funding from Congress to begin an overt “train and equip” program for vetted
Syrians for the following purposes:

defending the Syrian people from attacks by the Syrian regime, facilitating the provision of
essential services, and stabilizing territory controlled by the opposition;

defending the United States, its friends and allies, and the Syrian people from the threats
posed by terrorists in Syria; and,

promoting the conditions for a negotiated settlement to end the conflict in Syria.

The President amended the request in September 2014 to reflect additional goals for combatting
the Islamic State.

1 Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel said in a September 2013 hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
that the Administration was taking steps to provide arms to some Syrian rebels under covert action authorities.
Secretary Flagel described lethal assistance program and said, “This is, as you know, a covert action. And, as Secretary
Kerry noted, probably to [go] into much more detail would — would require a closed or classified hearing.”

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The FY2015 Continuing Resolution (RL. 113-164, “the FY2015 CR”) contained temporary
authorization for the training and equipping of vetted Syrians that differed from the
Administration’s requests and expired on December 1 1, 2014.

The FY2015NDAA (Sections 1209, 1510, and 1534 of Division A of P.L. 113-291) and the
Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 (‘Counterterrorism Partnership
Fund’ and Section 9016 of PL. 113-235) provided further authority and funding guidance for the
program. Like the FY2015 CR, these acts authorized the provision of U.S. assistance to vetted
Syrians by the Department of Defense (DOD) in coordination with the State Department for the
following purposes:

1) Defending the Syrian people from attacks by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
(1S1L), and securing territory controlled by the Syrian opposition.

(2) Protecting the United States, its friends and allies, and the Syrian people from the threats
posed by terrorists in Syria.

(3) Promoting the conditions for a negotiated settlement to end the conflict in Syria.

In setting these conditions, Congress rejected the Administration’s request for explicit authority to
train and equip Syrians to defend Syrian civilians from Syrian government forces. Authority for
training for such defensive action may be implied by the phrases referring to “securing territory”
and promoting conditions for a negotiated settlement to the wider conflict.

Relative to the authority enacted in the FY2015 CR, the FY2015 full-year appropriations and
NDAA:

• Expanded the types of assistance to be provided from training and equipment to
include stipends and construction of training and other facilities.

• Added vetting requirements for program participants to include commitment to
human rights, rule of law, and “a peaceful and democratic Syria.”

• Required 15-day advance notifications of a detailed plan before funds can be
obligated, and continued to require approval by the four congressional defense
committees of individual reprogramming requests.

• Added criteria to notification and progress reporting requirements to provide
further metrics for program evaluation.

• Authorized assistance to third countries for program-related purposes.

• Stated that while the Syrian program may draw on FY2015 CTPF funds that are
available for two years, during execution, FY2015 funds are to be transferred to
individual Operation and Maintenance (O&M) accounts that are available for
one-year.

• Ended (provided for the “sunset” of) the authority on December 3 1 , 2016, and
limited related funds to FY2015 monies and reprogramming requests to OCO-
designated Defense funds available from October 1, 2014, through September 30,

2016.

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• Permitted the President to waive any other provisions of law that woidd

otherwise restrict the provision of assistance authorized for the Syria program,
provided that the President notifies Congress 30-days in advance.

Chronology of “Train and Equip” Proposals and Enacted Legislation

• In 2013, legislation was introduced in both houses of Congress (H.R. 1327, S. 617, and S. 960) and considered by
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (S. 960) that would have provided authority to provide training and
assistance to armed elements of the Syrian opposition, subject to certain conditions.

• In June 20 1 4, the Senate Armed Services Committee reported its version of the FY20 1 5 defense authorization
bill, S. 2410, which would have provided a comparable, conditional authority, and, later that month, the Obama
Administration requested related “train and equip” authority and funding as part of its Overseas Contingency
Operations (OCO) request to Congress for FY20 1 5.

• Senate Appropriations Committee Members debated and approved a version of “train and equip” authority for
Syrians in July 2014 in their reported version of the FY20I5 defense appropriations bill (H.R. 4870 RS). The
Senate Appropriations Committee considered and rejected a proposed amendment to strip the authority and
related funding from the bill. The House-enacted version of the bill does not include such authority.

• In September, the Obama Administration submitted an informal revision of its OCO request to Congress to
reflect its new goal of “degrading and defeating” the “Islamic State” organization in Iraq and Syria.

• On September 15, Representative Howard “Buck” McKeon, who is Chairman of the House Armed Services
Committee, introduced an amendment (hereinafter the McKeon Amendment) to the FY20I5 continuing
resolution (H.J.Res. 124) that represented a counterproposal to the President’s informal revision. The House
adopted the amendment (H.Amdt. I 14 1) by a vote of 273 to 1 56 on September 1 7, and the Senate passed the
amended bill by a vote of 78 to 22 on September 1 8. The amendment text was included as Section 1 49 of
H.J.Res. 1 24/P. L. 113-164.

• FY20 1 5 Department of Defense appropriations, which included funds and authorities for the Department of
Defense to train and equip vetted Syrians, were enacted in H.R. 83. On December I I, the House agreed to the
final version of H.R. 83 by a vote 219-206. This version was agreed to by the Senate two days later, by a vote of
56-40. President Obama signed H.R. 83 into law (P.L. I 13-235) on December 16, 2014.

• The FY20I5 NDAA (H.R. 3979) also included authorities for the Department of Defense to train and equip
vetted Syrians. On December 4, the House adopted the final version of the NDAA by a vote of 300- 1 1 9. The
Senate agreed to the House version on December 1 2, 20 1 4, by a vote of 89- 1 I . President Obama signed the bill
into law P.L. I 13-291 on December 19, 2014.

How has the executive branch implemented the Syria Train and
Equip Program to date?

As of June 2015, several hundred U.S. military training personnel and a similar number of
support personnel have deployed in support of the Syria Train and Equip Program. According to
Administration officials, the program intends to field a force of approximately 3,000 vetted
Syrians in 2015 and 5,400 others per year in 2016 and, if authorized, in 2017. Congressional
defense committees approved initial funding for the program in late 2014, and approved related
transfers and further funding in early 20 15. 2

2 See U.S. Department of Defense Comptroller, Implemented Reprogramming Actions - FY2015, Actions 15-02-PA,
15-10-PA, and 15-07-IR. Available at: [http://comptroller.defense.gov/BudgetExecution/ReprogrammingFY2015.aspx]

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According to U.S. officials, program implementers have engaged with different Syrian groups in
order to identify potential recruits for the program and worked with partner governments for
assistance in vetting participants (see “Vetting Definitions” in Table 1 below). Press reports citing
unnamed U.S. officials suggested that fighting in Syria and uncertainties among Syrian
opposition members and their regional backers about the program’s purpose and about the general
level of U.S. support for anti-Asad efforts delayed the program to some extent. 3

Nevertheless, as of late March 2015, U.S. officials reportedly had identified more than 2,000
planned participants and vetted 400 of them. Training began for the first batch of 90 recruits in
early May. 4 U.S. officials have declined to publicly identify locations where training may take
place, but Turkish officials have stated that training activities related to the program are underway
in Turkey. 5 Various press reports also claim that Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar have agreed to
host program activities. The United Kingdom has announced its intention to support the U.S.
training program by sending 75 training personnel to participate.

Congressional Action

The Administration’s FY2016 defense appropriations request seeks $600 million in additional
U.S. funding for the program. The House and Senate versions of the FY2016 National Defense
Authorization Act (H.R. 1735 and S. 1376) would authorize that level of funding on different
terms (see “Funding Source” in Table 1), and would create new reporting and certification
requirements relative to the provision of U.S. support to U.S. -trained fighters in the event of their
attack by pro-Asad or Islamic State forces (see “What degree of post-training support or
protection should the U.S. government provide to Syrian trainees and on what terms?” below). As
noted above, some Members of Congress seek to ensure that the Administration clearly
determines and communicates the types of support it is prepared to provide to program
participants after their return to Syria.

What other U.S. government efforts complement the Syria Train
and Equip Program?

The State Department has sought new and used existing authorities to provide nonlethal
assistance, including to armed groups, notwithstanding other provisions of law restricting the
provision of U.S. assistance in Syria and to Syrians. As of March 2015, the United States had
allocated “nearly $400 million in assistance that supports the Syrian opposition since the start of
the revolution.” 6 This total includes more than $30 million in assistance reprogrammed in March
2015 in order to provide non-lethal equipment, vehicles, and supplies to “moderate” armed Syrian
opposition forces in Syria in parallel to the DOD-led train and equip program. Vetting procedures

3 Dasha Afanasieva, Warren Strobel and Phil Stewart, “Set to begin, U.S. plan for Syrian rebels already mired in
doubt,” Reuters, April 27, 2015; and, W.J. Hennigan and Patrick J. McDonnell, “$500-million program to train anti-
Islamic State fighters appears stalled,” Los Angeles Times, May 4, 2015.

4 Briefing by Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter and CJCS General Martin E. Dempsey, May 7, 2015.

5 Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu quoted in “Training programs starts for Syrian opposition in Turkey, UK
offers support,” Daily Sabah Online (Istanbul), June 5, 2015.

6 Office of the State Department Spokesperson, New Non-Lethal Assistance for the Syrian Opposition, March 13,

2015.

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for these transfers have not been publicly described in detail by State Department officials and it
is unclear how or whether they differ from vetting used for the DOD train and equip program.

• Section 704 1 (i) of Division K of the FY2014 Consolidated Appropriations Act
(P.L. 113-76) significantly expanded the Administration’s authority to provide
nonlethal assistance in Syria for certain purposes 7 using the Economic Support
Fund (ESF) account. Section 7041(h) of Division J of the FY2015 appropriations
act (P.L. 113-235) extends this notwithstanding authority to FY2015 ESF funds,
subject to an update of a required strategy document. Such assistance had been
restricted by a series of preexisting provisions of law (including some terrorism-
related provisions) that required the President to assert emergency and
contingency authorities to provide such assistance to the Syrian opposition and
communities in Syria. Such restrictions continue to limit the provision of certain
types of non-lethal assistance to armed opposition groups from foreign assistance
accounts.

• As of June 9, the draft Flouse Appropriations Committee version of the FY2016
State and Foreign Operations Appropriations Act would again extend the
notwithstanding authority to FY2016 ESF funds. 8

• The Administration sought a broad expansion of the limited notwithstanding
authority granted in the FY2014 appropriations act as part of its amended
November 2014 request for OCO funds to combat the Islamic State organization.

That request was not granted, possibly signaling some congressional desire to
maintain limitations on the ease of providing U.S. assistance in Syria or to
Syrians without specific congressional approval or oversight.

Should the authorized purposes of U.S. assistance be modified?

Legislation enacted by Congress to date does not explicitly authorize the provision of U.S.
assistance for this purpose and explicitly identifies the Islamic State organization rather than the
Syrian government as the entity from which Syrians should be trained and equipped to protect
themselves. U.S. assistance may aid vetted Syrians in providing for the defense of territory under
opposition control from unspecified adversaries and in “promoting the conditions for a negotiated
settlement to end the conflict in Syria.” Most observers assume a negotiated settlement to the
conflict would include some changes to the leadership or structure of the Syrian government.

Developments in the conflict in Syria, including the continued use of indiscriminate aerial attacks
by pro-Asad forces on opposition-held areas and allegations of attacks by pro-Asad forces using
chemicals as a weapon of war, have shaped congressional debate over the purposes and scope of
the train and equip program since early 2015. During this period, some Syrian opposition activists
and their U.S. supporters — including some Members of Congress — have stated their preference

7 Those purposes are: to “(A) establish governance in Syria that is representative, inclusive, and accountable; (B)
develop and implement political processes that are democratic, transparent, and adhere to the rule of law; (C) further
the legitimacy of the Syrian opposition through cross-border programs; (D) develop civil society and an independent
media in Syria; (E) promote economic development in Syria; (F) document, investigate, and prosecute human rights
violations in Syria, including through transitional justice programs and support for nongovernmental organizations; and
(G) counter extremist ideologies.”

8 Available at: [http://appropriations.house.gov/uploadedfiles/bills-l 14hr-sc-ap-fy2016-stateforop-
subcommitteedraft.pdf]

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for a broader scope of U.S. assistance and/or U.S. military intervention to protect civilians or
establish so-called safe zones or no-fly zones. However, other Syrian groups may reject deeper
U.S. involvement or prefer that the United States focus any assistance on toppling the Asad
government rather than pursuing counterterrorism, humanitarian, security, or regional stability
concerns.

Looking ahead, political-military conditions in Syria may continue to pose challenges for U.S.
efforts to train and equip vetted Syrians for U.S. -defined purposes. Most armed opposition groups
have sought U.S. and other third-party assistance since the outbreak of conflict for the expressed
purpose of toppling the government of Bashar al Asad and replacing it with various Islamist or
secular alternatives. However, as of June 2015, Congress has not directly authorized U.S.
assistance to support offensive, regime-change oriented anti-Asad operations by U.S. -trained
forces.

Congressional Action

The FY2016 defense authorization and appropriations legislation under congressional
consideration as of June 2015 would not further define “conditions for a negotiated settlement,”
nor would it modify the purposes of U.S. assistance that were stated in enacted FY2015
legislation. Specifically, the FY2016 proposals would not expand or restrict the stated purposes of
U.S. assistance (see below) with regard to training Syrians for offensive anti-Asad operations or
explicitly authorize such operations by U.S. military forces.

The following sections review legislative and policy developments related to the purposes of
Syria Train and Equip Program assistance stated in enacted FY2015 legislation.

Defending Syrian Civilians from Attacks

The Administration’s September 2014 request for authority envisioned a broader protection
purpose for U.S. assistance relative to the purposes defined in enacted FY2015 legislation. The
purposes stated in the enacted FY2015 legislation authorize assistance to assist vetted Syrians in
defending against attacks by the Islamic State organization and do not mention the Asad
government in this context. They also do not specify the types of attacks Syrians are to be assisted
in defending against.

President Obama and Administration officials have indicated that U.S. assistance will be provided
in line with a so-called “1S1L -first strategy,” but also will permit program participants to defend
against attacks by pro-Asad forces. Overall, press reports citing unnamed U.S. officials indicate
that defensive rather than offensive training and equipment is to be provided under the program. 9

Section 1228 of the House-enrolled FY2016 NDAA (H.R. 1735) would require the President to
report to Congress to assess the potential effectiveness of and requirements for the establishment
of safe zones or a no-fly zone in Syria. In March 2015, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
General Martin Dempsey told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that U.S. officials had

9 Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “Syrians to be trained to defend territory, not take ground from jihadists, officials say,”
Washington Post, October 22, 2014.

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